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Summary
If you draw from memory a picture of the front of your child-
hood home, you will have demonstrated recall. You could
also recognize this house upon seeing it. Unlike recognition,
recall demonstrates memory for things that are not present.
Recall is necessary for planning and imagining, and it can
increase the flexibility of navigation, social behavior, and
other cognitive skills. Without recall, memory ismore limited
to recognition of the immediate environment. Amnesic
patients are impaired on recall tests [1, 2], and recall perfor-
mance often declines with aging [3]. Despite its importance,
we know relatively little about nonhuman animals’ ability to
recall information; we lack suitable recall tests for them
and depend instead on recognition tests to measure
nonhuman memory. Here we report that rhesus monkeys
can recall simple shapes from memory and reproduce
them on a touchscreen. As in humans [4, 5], monkeys
remembered less in recall than recognition tests, and their
recall performance deteriorated more slowly. Transfer tests
showed that monkeys used a flexible memory mechanism
rather than memorizing specific actions for each shape.
Observation of recall in Old World monkeys suggests that
it has been adaptive for over 30 million years [6] and does
not depend on language.
Results and Discussion
Humans can freely recall information from memory, as when
describing a criminal suspect. We can also recognize whether
something currently experienced was experienced before, as
when choosing a suspect from a line up. Recall and recogni-
tion describe two types of tests or retrieval situations. The
critical distinction is whether the material to be remembered
is present when you try to remember it. In humans, accurate
performance in recall and recognition situations differentially
recruits two types of memory: recollection and familiarity [7,
8]. Recollection often involves a deliberate retrieval of informa-
tion, sometimes accompanied by additional details, such as
study context. In contrast, familiarity produces a relatively
vague judgment of novelty or recency, as when you know
that you have met someone before but cannot remember their
name or where you met.
Successful recognition of something can occur either by
recollecting it or by detecting that it is familiar [9]. In contrast,
for successful recall, one must bring the memory to mind
through recollection; the studied material is not present to re-
experience as familiar. The ability to recall information is
particularly important because it frees memory from exclusive
control by immediate time and place. Recognition can only*Correspondence: bbasile@emory.eduhappen when we reperceive something we have perceived
before. Normal tasks, like planning a meeting or giving driving
directions, would be impossible if the things we needed to
remember—meeting attendees or street names—had to be
present for us to remember them. Accordingly, loss of recall
ability drastically impairs quality of life; poor recall perfor-
mance is a central deficit in amnesic patients following brain
damage ([1, 2], but see [10]), and recall performance often
declines during aging [3, 11]. Recall tests are critical to our
understanding of the evolution of memory and other cognitive
abilities and to our ability to diagnose and treat memory
impairments.
Ask humanswhat they recall and they can tell you; give them
a blank piece of paper and they can drawwhat they have seen.
In contrast, nonhuman animals do not have language and do
not naturally draw, making it difficult to create controlled
conditions under which we can measure recall. Consequently,
virtually all tests of memory usedwith nonhumans are recogni-
tion tests. Nonhumans can be trained to touch, peck, or look at
a familiar image when it is re-presented after a delay, thereby
reliably measuring memory in a recognition format (e.g., [12,
13]). Some investigators have devised clever tests intended
to measure the distinct contributions of recollection and
familiarity to memory performance in nonhumans (e.g., [14,
15]). These tests have led to important insights; however, all
of them use recognition paradigms that leave the conclusions
controversial [16]. Because themajor barrier to testing recall in
nonhumans is the lack of language as a readout of the contents
of memory, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the most
convincing demonstrations of recollection in a nonhuman
comes from a lexigram-trained chimpanzee [17]. After having
seen food or a desired object hidden in the forest outside
her enclosure, Panzee spontaneously recruited help from
human caretakers, pointed outside toward the forest, and
touched the lexigram that corresponded to the hidden item.
This test situation parallels recall tests because she reported
the location and identity of the hidden food while inside;
both the forest and the food were out of sight. Panzee’s use
of lexigrams appears to give researchers a unique tool to
access her memory. However, tests of memory using
lexigrams can still be reasonably characterized as recognition
tests, albeit ones with hundreds of possible choices. Panzee
‘‘did not literally draw a lexigram or a map of the forest’’
([18], p. 214), but her performance suggests that she had the
necessary information to do so if she could draw. If an animal
could draw or reproduce a previously seen image, that would
provide a powerful test of recall in nonhumans.
In the current study, we trained five rhesus monkeys on
a novel recall test in which they had to reproduce a simple
figure on a touchscreen from memory. Our test was modeled
after the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test [19], in which
humans draw a complicated shape from memory. The
Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test is a well-established
tool that has been used to diagnose recall impairments in
amnesic humans [1]. During the study phase, monkeys saw
a simple shape composed of two or three colored boxes
located on a 5 3 5 grid on a computer touchscreen. During
the test phase, one of the boxes appeared in a new location
Figure 1. Time Course of a Recall and Recogni-
tion Trial during Comparison
Schematic of the progression of a recall test (top)
and matched recognition test (bottom). Monkeys
started both tests by touching the green start
box. An image then appeared, and they had to
touch the blue box, ensuring that they had seen
the sample image. After a delay, the blue box
appeared in a new location, and the monkeys
touched it to initiate the test phase. For the recall
tests, monkeys earned food if they reproduced
the studied shape by touching the appropriate
grid location for the red box. For the recognition
tests, monkeys earned food for touching the
test stimulus if it was the same as that presented
during the study phase (depicted) or for touching
the nonmatch symbol if it was not. The small
white crosses shown in the last panel of the recall
test indicated to the monkeys which response
locations were available. In the first phase of
training, the white crosses were present in all
the locations abutting the blue box. For the
comparison with recognition, we reduced the
response locations to two, which allowed us to
equate the chance rate in the recall and recogni-
tion tests at 50%, permitting us to directly
compare performance in the two types of test.
To prevent accidental responding, each
response required two consecutive touches to
the same location.
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by touching the appropriate grid locations (Figure 1, top; see
also Movie S1 available online). When successful, they earned
food; errors were followed by a time out and no food. Critically,
monkeys could not solve this memory test using familiarity,
because the image to be remembered was not present during
the test phase to experience as familiar. We hypothesized that
if monkeys have recollection, they would be able to reproduce
these simple shapes in this recall format.
All monkeys learned to reproduce two-box shapes after
a brief delay more accurately than expected by chance
(chance = 12.5%; mean accuracy = 27.6%; binomial tests; all
p < 0.002). This performance parallels the way humans repro-
duce the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure. Unlike recognition
tests, in which the target shape would have been present
during the test phase, the monkeys had to reproduce the
target from memory, making this the first pure recall test for
monkeys.
Having established that monkeys can perform in a test
methodologically similar to human recall tests, we further as-
sessed the validity of our new paradigm by comparing it to
a preciselymatched recognition test. We tested for two perfor-
mance differences diagnostic of recollection and familiarity.
First, humans usually recall less information than they recog-
nize [4]. This is because recall performance is based solely
on successful recollection, whereas recognition performance
is a combination of both recollection and correct familiarity
judgments. Second, familiarity makes proportionally more
contribution to human recognition performance at short
memory delays [5, 20]. Consequently, higher accuracy on
recognition tests should be most evident at short delays. To
test for these patterns in our monkeys, we compared perfor-
mance on our recall test to that on a precisely matched recog-
nition test that had the same chance rate, used the same
stimuli, required the same responses, and used the same
study-test intervals (Figure 1, bottom).Consistent with the hypothesis that the recall and recogni-
tion tests measure different kinds of memory, we found that
recognition accuracy was higher than recall accuracy at short
delays but declined more rapidly (Figure 2). The striking
similarity of these patterns in monkey recall and recognition
performance to human performance on comparable tests
[5, 20] suggests two things. First, our shape reproduction
test measures recollection, similar to human drawing tests.
Second, monkey memory is similar to human memory; it likely
includes two processes, recollection and familiarity, that
contribute differentially to recall and recognition performance.
One common criticism of studies of nonhumans is that
subjects may solve even complex tasks using relatively
simple, inflexible stimulus-response rules acquired through
extensive training. Monkeys might have learned a fixed
response appropriate for each sample image. Such inflexible
stimulus-response rules could result in performance that
superficially resembled recall but would not generalize to
novel images. To evaluate whether monkeys used flexible rec-
ollective memory or rigid response rules, we tested whether
performance generalized to novel three-box shapes. We did
this both under conditions in which the chance rate remained
the same as in earlier tests (reproduce one box of a novel
three-box shape) and under conditions in which the difficulty
was increased (reproduce two boxes of a novel three-box
shape).Wehypothesized that ifmonkeys had learned ageneral
reproduction rule rather than inflexible stimulus-response
rules, accuracy would be significantly above chance in the first
session with each of these novel test conditions.
Monkeys immediately transferred recall performance to
novel three-box shapes (Figure 3). Accuracy was significantly
above chance both when monkeys had to produce one box of
a novel three-box shape and when they had to reproduce two
boxes to complete a three-box shape. Generalization to novel
shapes shows that monkeys remembered the images in a flex-
ible way that parallels human recall. The small number of trials
Figure 2. Comparison of Recall and Recognition Accuracy as a Function of
Memory Delay
Under precisely matched testing conditions, monkeys showed greater
accuracy and faster forgetting in the recognition test than in the recall test
(two-factor within-subject analysis of variance [test type X delay]: main
effect of test type [F(1,4) = 6.66, p = 0.061], main effect of delay [F(7,28) =
38.54, p < 0.001], and interaction [F(7,28) = 3.96, p = 0.004]). Accuracy in
both recall and recognition is reported as d0 [26], as a function of the delay
in seconds between study and test. Error bars represent 1 standard error of
the mean.
Figure 3. Recall Performance on Trained Shapes and on Novel Shapes
during Transfer Tests
Monkeys successfully generalized to novel shapes. Accuracy was above
chance on the first session both when monkeys had to reproduce one
box of a three-box shape (middle; chance = 0.5; one-sample t test: t(4) =
7.03, p = 0.002) and when they had to reproduce two boxes of a three-
box shape (right; chance = 0.25; one-sample t test: t(4) = 10.75, p < 0.001).
Dashed lines represent accuracy expected by chance. Asterisks mark
performance that is significantly above chance. Error bars are6 1 standard
error of the mean.
Current Biology Vol 21 No 9
776received during the generalization tests (144 trials), and the
large number of novel shapes (28 three-box shapes), makes
it unlikely that themonkeys learned a new set of response rules
for each new shape.
Comparing recall and recognition is complicated. The two
tasks usually require different types of responses and have
drastically different chance rates. In the current experiment,
we matched the recall and recognition tests on all critical
procedural details, allowing us to attribute the observed differ-
ences in accuracy and forgetting to the types of memory used
in the two tests. The design of our tests also rules out several
alternative strategies. Monkeys could not have solved the
recall test by constantly touching the location of the studied
shape during the delay because the shape moved between
study and test. They could not have solved the task by
repeating a motor response made during the study phase
because they were not required to touch all boxes during the
study phase. Finally, they could not have solved the task using
a set of inflexible stimulus-response rules because they imme-
diately transferred performance to novel shapes. Monkeys
appear to have solved the recall task by recollecting the
studied shape when they could not see it.
This new recall test for nonhuman primates advances our
understanding of the range of memory types present in
monkeys and available for neurobiological study. Compari-
sons of recall and recognition performance in amnesic
patients have stimulated considerable excitement and contro-
versy about the neural substrates of memory [21, 22]. These
controversies are difficult to address conclusively in humans
because accidental brain damage is rarely selective or
complete for a given structure. Studies of nonhumans allow
for tighter experimental control over variables of interest,
such as prior stimulus exposure and training, and permit meth-
odologies that are difficult or impossible to use in humans. Use
of these techniques with this new recall test promises new
insights into the organization of human and nonhuman
memory.The presence of recollection in rhesus monkeys suggests
that ancestors common to humans and Old World monkeys
evolved under selection pressures favoring the ability to recall
as well as recognize. Recollection and familiarity likely evolved
because they solved functionally incompatible problems [23].
For example, familiarity does not support detailed memory for
context, but it is quick [24] and resistant to distraction [25].
Recollection is slower and more vulnerable to distraction but
supports a more detailed and flexible use of memory. Famil-
iarity might better allow rapid responses to foods and
predators under distracting conditions, whereas recollection
might be necessary to access knowledge of distant food loca-
tions or past social interactions for planning future behavior. In
this study, we have demonstrated recall performance in
monkeys under limited laboratory conditions. Further work
will be required to understand how this performance relates
to natural behavior.Experimental Procedures
Subjects and Apparatus
Five adult male rhesus macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were tested
6 days a week in their home cages using portable touchscreen computer
rigs (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). All procedures were
approved by the Emory University Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee and complied with United States law.Initial Training
Monkeys first learned to touch accurately within the small boxes of the
response grid to turn boxes red. Next, they learned to reproduce one box
of a stationary two-box shape after a 0 s delay. Finally, they learned to repro-
duce the box after a 1 s delay when it appeared in different locations during
the test phase and during the study phase. The final phase was identical to
that in Figure 1 (top), with the exception that white crosses appeared in all
eight adjacent grid locations and therefore did not limit the available
response locations. See Supplemental Experimental Procedures for addi-
tional training details.
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Monkeys learned a match/nonmatch recognition test (Figure 1, bottom),
and this new test and the recall test were trained to stability (six sessions
with no significant change in accuracy; see Supplemental Experimental
Procedures). Identical shapes were used in the recognition and recall tests.
Chance rates in the two tests were equated at 50%by providing one correct
and one incorrect choice during the test phase in both tasks. For the recall
test, the blue box was presented with only two possible adjacent choices,
indicated by white crosshairs, rather than the eight choices used in initial
training. For the recognition test, one shapewas presentedwith a nonmatch
symbol (Figure 1).
One session of each type was given per day, with testing order alternated
between days, for 11 days. The delay was 1 s on slightly less than half the
trials (because of constraints of counterbalancing trial types), and delays
of 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128 sweremixed pseudorandomly among the other
half of the trials. Because the addition of varied delays was novel, we
excluded the first session of each test type, leaving 600 trials at the trained
delay and 120 trials at each of the other delays from each monkey for
analysis.
Because our recognition test was a match/nonmatch test, we used
d0 values, which provide a measure of accuracy that is unbiased by any
overall tendency to choose match or nonmatch [26]. Using d0 scores also
allowed us to directly compare accuracy on the match/nonmatch recogni-
tion test with accuracy on the two-choice recall test by transforming the
proportion of correct scores on the recall test into d0 scores ([26],
Table A5.7).Transfer of Recall Performance to Novel Shapes
In the first recall transfer test, we assessed whether monkeys would gener-
alize performance to novel three-box shapes under conditions in which they
had to reproduce one box during the test phase. During the study phase,
monkeys saw a shape composed of one blue box and two red boxes. During
the test phase, the blue box appeared in a new location alongwith one of the
red boxes (chosen at random) and two possible response locations indi-
cated by white crosses. Monkeys received a single session consisting of
all 504 possible shape/location configurations in a random order. Only the
first 144 trials were used to assess transfer in order to equate this test
with those used in the previous experiments and to limit the opportunity
for the monkeys to learn responses specific to each new stimulus.
In the second transfer test, monkeys again saw three-box shapes during
the study phase, but only the blue box appeared during the test phase,
along with four possible response locations indicated by white crosses
(see Movie S1). Monkeys had to reproduce both red boxes correctly by
touching the two correct grid locations. After one red box was added
correctly, one of the two remaining incorrect response locations became
unresponsive, and the corresponding white cross disappeared. Chance
was 50% for each box and 25% for reproducing both boxes correctly.
Again, the first 144 trials served as the critical transfer data. Proportions
were arcsine transformed prior to analysis to better approximate normality
[27].Supplemental Information
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and onemovie and can be found with this article online at doi:10.1016/j.cub.
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